The DKIM signature includes a fingerprint of the message body. The receiver recomputed it and got something different: the body changed after the message was signed. Something between the sender and the inbox added or rewrote content — a footer, a disclaimer, rewritten links, a forwarder re-encoding it.
dkim=fail (body hash did not verify) header.d=example.com
How other mail servers write it
Gmail
dkim=neutral (body hash did not verify) header.i=@example.com header.s=s1 header.b=AbCdEf12
Exim (common on cPanel)
dkim=fail (body hash mismatch; body probably modified in transit) header.d=example.com header.s=s1
Amavis
dkim=fail (2048-bit key) reason="fail (body has been altered)" header.d=example.com
| Result | dkim=fail (body hash did not verify) |
| Usually fixed by | The sender, or whoever forwarded it |
| Checked | The bh= tag in the DKIM-Signature: a hash of the body when it was signed |
| Gmail writes it as | dkim=neutral, not fail |
| Effect | Treated as if the message were not signed (RFC 6376 §6.1) |
Check the DKIM key
Enter the domain from header.d and the selector from header.s (or the DKIM-Signature’s d= and s=): we fetch the published key and check it.
What it means
DKIM signs two things: the headers, and a hash of the body. This result means the body hash in the signature no longer matches the body that arrived, so the signature proves nothing and the message counts as unsigned. DMARC then depends on SPF — which forwarding often breaks too.
It is rarely an attack. The usual culprit is a system that edits mail on the way out or in, after the signature was made.
Why it happens
- A mailing list adding a footer or rewriting the subject.
- A security gateway or mail server adding a disclaimer, a signature block or an “external sender” banner after signing.
- Link tracking or URL rewriting applied after the message was signed.
- A forwarder re-encoding the message, or whitespace and line endings changed under simple canonicalization.
- A signature with an l= tag, and content added beyond the signed length.
How to fix it
- Sign last: make DKIM signing the final step after every footer, disclaimer and rewrite — or have the gateway that edits the message sign it again.
- Use relaxed canonicalization (c=relaxed/relaxed), which tolerates harmless whitespace changes.
- For mailing lists and forwarders you do not control, the fix is theirs: rewriting the From address, or sealing with ARC.
- Send a test to our email test to see the signature the receiver gets.
See it for yourself
dig TXT s1._domainkey.example.com +short
The key is fine if it resolves — a body hash failure is about what happened to the message, not the key.
Questions
Is the message forged?
Usually not. A body hash failure means the content changed after signing, and the common reasons are innocent: footers, disclaimers, link rewriting. A forgery would more often show no signature, or one for another domain.
Sources
Error text and meaning checked on 25 September 2026 against these official sources:
- RFC 6376 — rfc-editor.org
- Anti-spam message headers — learn.microsoft.com
- Troubleshoot email authentication in Microsoft 365 — learn.microsoft.com
- Troubleshoot DKIM issues — knowledge.workspace.google.com