DMARC needs SPF or DKIM to pass for a domain that matches the one in the From address. Neither did. Often both passed — but for a sending service’s own domain, not yours. Whether the message was then rejected, sent to spam or delivered depends on the domain’s policy and the receiver.
dmarc=fail (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=QUARANTINE) header.from=example.com
How other mail servers write it
Microsoft 365 and Outlook.com
dmarc=fail action=quarantine header.from=example.com
Microsoft, policy reject
dmarc=fail action=oreject header.from=example.com
Gmail, overridden by ARC
dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE arc=pass) header.from=example.com
OpenDMARC
dmarc=fail (p=reject dis=none) header.from=example.com
rspamd
dmarc=fail reason="No valid SPF, No valid DKIM" header.from=example.com (policy=reject)
| Result | dmarc=fail |
| Usually fixed by | The sender, or whoever forwarded it |
| Needs | SPF or DKIM passing for a domain aligned with the From domain |
| p=, dis= | The published policy, and what the receiver actually did (Gmail, OpenDMARC) |
| Standard | RFC 9989 (May 2026), replacing RFC 7489 |
Check the DMARC record
Enter the domain from header.from: we find its DMARC record, walking up from a subdomain, and explain every tag.
What it means
Alignment is the part people miss. SPF passes for the envelope sender’s domain and DKIM for the signing domain (d=); DMARC counts them only when that domain matches the From domain — the same organisational domain under relaxed alignment, the exact name under strict. A newsletter sent through a service without your domain set up passes SPF and DKIM for the service, and fails DMARC for you.
In Gmail’s comment, p= is the policy the domain publishes and dis= the disposition Gmail applied. A receiver may apply less than the policy — for a trusted forwarder, a mailing list, or ARC showing the message passed before it was forwarded — and RFC 9989 tells receivers not to reject on p=reject alone. Microsoft’s action= is its version: quarantine, oreject, and pct.* values for records that still carry pct.
Why it happens
- A sending service not set up with your domain: it signs with its own d= and uses its own bounce domain — Amazon SES, SendGrid and Mailchimp all do by default.
- The message was forwarded or went through a mailing list, breaking SPF and often DKIM.
- Strict alignment (aspf=s, adkim=s) with mail sent from a subdomain.
- Someone sending as your domain without permission — DMARC doing its job.
How to fix it
- At each sending service, set up DKIM with your own domain (custom DKIM, domain authentication) — the most reliable way to align.
- Where offered, set a custom return-path (MAIL FROM) subdomain so SPF aligns too.
- Use relaxed alignment unless you have a reason not to.
- Collect DMARC reports: they show which sources fail, before you tighten the policy.
See it for yourself
dig TXT _dmarc.example.com +short
Questions
SPF and DKIM both passed. Why did DMARC fail?
Because they passed for other domains. Look at smtp.mailfrom and header.d (or header.i): if neither is your From domain or one of its subdomains, nothing aligned.
The policy is p=reject, so why was the message delivered?
Receivers decide. Gmail shows it as dis=NONE or dis=QUARANTINE; the usual reasons are a trusted forwarder, a mailing list, ARC, or local policy. RFC 9989 asks receivers not to reject on p=reject alone.
Sources
Error text and meaning checked on 25 September 2026 against these official sources:
- RFC 9989: Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) — rfc-editor.org
- RFC 9990: Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) Aggregate Reporting — rfc-editor.org
- Anti-spam message headers — learn.microsoft.com
- Set up DMARC to validate email in Microsoft 365 — learn.microsoft.com
- Complying with DMARC authentication protocol in Amazon SES — docs.aws.amazon.com
- Configure domain authentication — twilio.com
- Set Up Email Domain Authentication — mailchimp.com