A TLSA record publishes which certificate a TLS service uses, in DNS signed with DNSSEC. For email it lets sending servers insist on encryption to your mail server and refuse an impostor — a stronger guarantee than MTA-STS, but only for DNSSEC-signed domains.
| Type number | 52 |
| Name format | _port._protocol.host, e.g. _25._tcp.mail.example.com |
| Requires | DNSSEC on the zone |
| Usual form for mail | 3 1 1 |
| Defined in | RFC 6698 |
Look up the TLSA records of any name
One question to DNS, answered as it is. You can change the record type too.
What it does
The three numbers say what is pinned. Usage 3 (DANE-EE) pins the server’s own certificate; selector 1 means its public key rather than the whole certificate; matching type 1 means a SHA-256 hash of it. “3 1 1” keeps working across renewals as long as the key stays the same, which is why RFC 7672 recommends it for mail.
A TLSA record that no longer matches the certificate makes DANE-aware senders refuse to deliver — so rotating the key means publishing the new record before switching.
How it is written
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Usage | 3 = the server’s own certificate (DANE-EE); 2 = a CA it chains to |
| Selector | 1 = public key; 0 = whole certificate |
| Matching type | 1 = SHA-256; 2 = SHA-512; 0 = exact |
| Data | The hash |
Examples
_25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA 3 1 1 0C72AC70B745AC19998811B131D662C9AC69DBDBE7CB23E5B514B56664C5D3D6
Mail to mail.example.com on port 25 must present this key.
Common mistakes
- Replacing the certificate’s key without first publishing a TLSA record for the new one.
- TLSA records on a zone without DNSSEC, where they are ignored.
What we recommend
Use 3 1 1, publish the next key’s record alongside the current one before rotating, and remove the old one afterwards.
The DNSSEC records TLSA depends on →
Sources
Checked on 25 September 2026 against these official sources: