DNSSEC signs a zone’s records so resolvers can tell a genuine answer from a forged one. The zone publishes its public keys as DNSKEY records; the registry publishes a fingerprint of the key as a DS record, which links your zone into the chain of trust from the root.
| Type numbers | DS 43, DNSKEY 48, RRSIG 46 |
| DS is published | At the registry, through your registrar |
| Recommended algorithm | 13 (ECDSA P-256) |
| Defined in | RFC 4034 |
Look up the DS records of any name
One question to DNS, answered as it is. You can change the record type too.
What it does
Each set of records gets a signature (RRSIG) made with the zone’s key. A validating resolver checks the signature against the DNSKEY, the DNSKEY against the DS record at the parent, and so on up to the root. Any break in that chain makes validating resolvers return SERVFAIL — the domain disappears for their users.
Most outages come from the DS record: left at the registry after moving to a DNS host that does not sign with the same key, or never removed after turning DNSSEC off.
How it is written
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| DS: key tag | Identifies the DNSKEY |
| DS: algorithm | The key’s algorithm (13 = ECDSA P-256) |
| DS: digest type | 2 = SHA-256 |
| DS: digest | The key’s fingerprint |
Examples
example.com. 86400 IN DS 2371 13 2 1F987CC6583E92DF0890718C42…
The registry’s fingerprint of example.com’s key 2371.
Common mistakes
- Moving DNS provider without first removing the DS record (or adding the new provider’s).
- Turning DNSSEC off at the DNS host but leaving the DS record at the registrar.
What we recommend
Use your DNS host’s one-click DNSSEC and let it give you the DS record; when moving providers, remove the DS first, move, then sign again.
Every record with its DNSSEC status →
Sources
Checked on 25 September 2026 against these official sources:
- RFC 4034: Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions — rfc-editor.org